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CRIMINAL LAW-ONE STEP CLOSER TO
AFFORDABILITY AS SJC RULES JUDGES MUST
NOW CONSIDER A DEFENDANT'S FINANCIAL
RESOURCES AS A FACTOR WHEN MAKING BAIL
DETERMINATIONS -BRANGAN V.
COMMONWEALTH, 80 N.E3D 949 (MASS. 2017).
The right to bail has been a part of Massachusetts law since the
codification of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1641.1 This right is
safeguarded by both the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as well
as Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and the importance
of that right has been highlighted by the judiciary for centuries.2 In Brangan
v. Commonwealth,3 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC")
addressed the extent to which a judge must consider a criminal defendant's
financial resources when setting bail. 4 In a unanimous decision, the court set

See Commonwealth v. Baker, 177 N.E.2d 783,784-85 (Mass. 1961) (noting right to bail has
been part of Massachusetts Body of Liberties since colonial times); see also Charles Doyle, Bail:
An Overview of FederalCriminalLaw, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, at 2 (July 31,2017),

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40222.pdf (discussing widely-recognized right to bail dating back to
Massachusetts Body of Liberties). The Massachusetts Body of Liberties states:
No mans person shall be restrained or imprisoned by any authority whatsoever, before
the law hath sentenced him thereto, if he can put in sufficient securitie, bayle or
mainprise, for his appearance, and good behaviour in the meane time, unless it be in
Crimes Capitall, and Contempts in open Court, and in such cases where some expresse
act of [the General] Court doth allow it.
See The Body ofLiberties, 18, reprinted in, WILLIAM H. WHITMORE, THE COLONIAL LAWS
OF MASSACHUSETTS 36 (1889).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. V1EI ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); MASS. CONST. Art. XXVI, pt. I ("No
magistrate or court of law, shall demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines,or inflict
cruel or unusual punishments."); Bail Not Jail, CARTER DEYOUNG ATIORNEYS AT LAW,

http://www.carterdeyoung.com/bail-not-jail, (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) ("As early as 1641, the
colonists recognized that a free society is premised upon the belief that its citizens should be
afforded due process of law before they are jailed for a crime for which they have yet to be
convicted and sentenced."); see, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (discussing important
implications and function of bail); United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442,444-45 (2d Cir. 1961)
(mentioning recognition of bail throughout U.S. history); Querubin v. Commonwealth 795 N.E.2d
534, 540-41 (Mass. 2003) (examining how purpose of bail is of "fundamental importance to the
basic functioning of the judiciary.").
3 80 N.E.3d 949 (Mass. 2017).
4 See id. at 954 (discussing consideration of financial resources).
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a new precedent, holding that when determining bail, a judge "must consider
a defendant's financial resources, but is not required to set bail in an amount
the defendant can afford if other relevant considerations weigh more heavily
than the defendant's ability to provide the necessary security for his
appearance at trial."'
On January 17, 2014, Jahmal Brangan robbed a bank in Springfield,
Massachusetts. 6 Following his arrest, Brangan appeared before the Superior
Court, where the judge set bail at $20,000 or $200,000 surety based on a
probation violation notice filed by the probation department.7 On March 10,
2014, after a grand jury indictment, Brangan was arraigned and the judge set
bail at $50,000 or $500,000 surety.8 A year later, Brangan was convicted on
the charge of armed robbery, but the trial judge declared a mistrial.9

See id. (stating same proposition within case); see also BailNot Jail, supra note 2 (analyzing
new precedent and maintaining ". . money should not be the determining factor as to when
someone's freedom is taken away."); Hon. Peter B. Krupp, A Callfor More Focused Advocacy:
2018),
BAR
JOURNAL
(Feb.
2,
Bail
After
Brangan, BOSTON
Setting
https://bostonbarjournal.com/tag/affordable-bail/ ("Although [this decision] did not purport to
change the law, Brangan, at a minimum, collected and clearly articulated the foundational
principles underlying bail, re-centering judges and advocates on what matters and what does not.").
6 See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 955 (stating facts from case). Brangan passed a note to the bank
teller, who then handed over less than $1,000, before fleeing the scene. Id. He was arrested later
that day after his thumbprint was found on the robbery note. Id.
7 See id. (describing Brangan's court proceedings). At the time, Brangan "was on probation
following a prison sentence of from eight to twelve years for rape of a child and related charges."
Id. The probation department ended up filing a notice of surrender, to which the judge relied on
when setting bail. Id. He was subsequently indicted by a grand jury for armed robbery while
masked under Massachusetts General Law Chapter ("M. G. L. c.") 265, § 17. M. G. L. c. 265, § 17
states the following:
Whoever, being armed with a dangerous weapon, assaults another and robs, steals or
takes from his person money or other property which may be the subject of larceny shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years;
provided, however, that any person who commits any offence described herein while
masked or disguised or while having his features artificially distorted shall, for the first
offence be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than five years and for any subsequent
offence for not less than ten years. Whoever commits any offense described herein while
armed with a firearm, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or assault weapon shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than five years. Any person who commits
a subsequent offense while armed with a firearm, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or assault
weapon shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than 15 years.
See Mass Gen. Laws ch. 265, §17.
See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 955 (discussing Brangan's bail).
9 See id. (discussing procedural history of case). The court declared a mistrial because of
"certain statements in the prosecutor's closing argument." Id. Prior to the declaration of a mistrial,
Brangan's bail was revoked. Id. However, after the mistrial order, the judge held another bail
hearing, where the original bail of $50,000 or $500,00 surety was reinstated. Id.
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Subsequently, Brangan unsuccessfully tried to seek reduction of his bail in
both July and December of 2015.10
Brangan filed four successive petitions, seeking relief from his
pretrial detentions in accordance with M. G. L. c. 211, § 3.11 Each of the
petitions were denied for various reasons and the defendant appealed
pursuant to SJC Rule 2:21 .12 The SJC ordered the appeal to proceed with
briefing and argument, noting that "filing a petition pursuant to M. G. L. c.
211, § 3 is the proper means for seeking relief from bail determinations in
the Superior Court, and that Brangan had no other means of obtaining
adequate appellate review." 3
The principle of bail is addressed in both the Eighth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution and Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights.1 4 While American bail laws have their roots in English common law,

10 See id. (stating same proposition). A month later, in January, the SJC granted "Brangan's
application for direct appellate review of the Commonwealth's appeal from the trial judge's mistrial
order." Id. The SJC held that the Commonwealth had no right to appeal, "leaving the armed robbery
to stand for retrial." Id.
" See id. at 955-56 (explaining Brangan's petition requests). M. G. L. c. 211, § 3 states that
the:
supreme judicial court shall have general superintendence of all courts of inferior
jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and abuses therein if no other remedy is
expressly provided; and it may issue all writs and processes to such courts and to
corporations and individuals which may be necessary to the furtherance of justice and to
the regular execution of the laws ....
See Mass Gen. Laws ch. 211, § 3.
12 See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d. at 956-57 (analyzing each appeal). The court stated that Brangan
"followed a long and tortuous path to seek relief from his pretrial detention. . .." Id. at 955. His
first petition was denied without prejudice "due to his failure to file the record materials necessary
to support his claims." Id. at 955-56. On considering Brangan's second petition, the single justice
remanded the matter for a hearing that reduced the defendant's bail for the armed robbery charge
and retained the original bail amount for the probation violation. Id. at 956. Upon filing a third
petition, the single justice remanded the matter again, and effectively came out the same way as
Brangan's second petition. Id. The judge justified denying Brangan's release on "personal
recognizance without surety" due to several factors that included his history of mental illness, the
potential penalty he faced, his conviction record, and the nature of the offense charged. Id. In his
fourth petition, Brangan argued that the judge had "failed to give meaningful consideration to his
inability to make the bail, to the equities in the case, and to his alternative proposal to post $5,000
cash bail and wear a GPS bracelet." Id. However, his petition was denied and appealed pursuant
to SJC Rule 2:21, which provides the parameters for when "a single justice denies relief from a
challenged interlocutory ruling in the trial court and does not report the denial of relief to the full
court, the party denied relief may appeal the single justice's ruling to the full court." Id. at 956-57;
see also SJC Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001) (stating means for utilization of SJC
Rule 2:21).
13 See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 957 (stating similar proposition).
14 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); MASS. CONST. Art. XXVI, pt. I ("No
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these laws have undergone significant changes throughout history." Stack
v. Boyle16 was the first major U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with the
administration of bail." In Stack, the Court discussed the dual-function of
bail and held that "[b]ail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably
calculated to [ensure the accused's presence in court] is 'excessive' under
the Eighth Amendment."" Both Stack and a later Supreme Court case,
Carlson v. Landon,19 established that "while a right to bail is a fundamental
precept of the law, it is not absolute, and its parameters must be determined
by federal and possibly state legislatures."20
In Massachusetts, the judiciary has held that a Superior Court
judges' authority to set bail can be found in M. G. L. c. 276, § 57 ("section
57").21 Interestingly, section 57 makes no mention of a defendant's financial
resources as a factor to be considered when making bail determinations.22
However, the SJC has interpreted section 57 to include consideration of a
defendant's financial resources, in addition to other historical common law

magistrate or court of law, shall demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict
cruel or unusual punishments.").
15 See, e.g., Amanda Zaniewski, Bail in the United States: A Brief Review of the Literature,
MASSACHUSETTS

DEP'T

OF

CORRECTIONS

(Nov.

2014),

http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/doc/research-reports/briefs-stats-bulletins/bail-in-united-statesliterature-review.pdf (tracing U.S. history of right to bail and its descent from English common
law); About Bail- History of Bail, PBUS, http://www.pbus.com/general/custom.asp?page= 14, (last
visited Nov. 11, 2017) (discussing how "knowledge of the English system and how it developed
until the time of American independence is essential [to understanding American bail laws].");
John-Michael Seibler & Jason Snead, The History of Cash Bail, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
(Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.heritage.org/courts/report/the-history-cash-bail (tracking history of
bail and waves of reform to date); Doyle, supra note 1 (outlining significant changes in bail
throughout history); see generally William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42
ALB. L. REv. 33, 34-66 (1977) (describing origins and history of bail in England).
16 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
7 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (discussing bail administration); see also Timothy R.
Schnacke, et. al, The History of Bail andPretrialRelease, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, at 8 (Sept.
23, 2010), https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ccjj/Committees/BailSublHandouts/HistoryofBail-PreTrialRelease-PJI_20 1O.pdf (stating significance of Stack as first major case dealing with bail).
18 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4-5 (holding as described).
'9 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
20 See Timothy R. Schnacke, et. al, supra note 16 (discussing impact of Stack and Carlson in
context of right to bail).
21 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Torres, 806 N.E.2d 895,897 (Mass. 2004) (maintaining section
57 authorizes judges to set bail); Querubin v. Commonwealth, 795 N.E.2d 534, 539 (Mass. 2003)
(holding section 57 is applicable to setting bail in the Superior Court); Sema v. Commonwealth,
768 NE.2d 548, 548 (Mass. 2002) (discussing reasoning behind applicability of section 57 in
setting bail over M. G. L. C. 276, § 58 ("section 58")).
22 See Mass Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 276, § 57 (LexisNexis 2017) (describing requirements of
statute entitled "Officials Authorized to Admit; Procedures; Persons Precluded from Admission.").
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factors .23 Specifically, in Querubin v. Commonwealth,24 the SJC refers to the
Reporters' Notes in Rule 6 of the Massachusetts Rules for Criminal
Procedure, which states that the aforementioned factors are to be considered
when conducting a bail hearing under section 57.25
Constitutional principles also help shed light on whether a
defendant's financial resources should be considered when setting bail. 26
Federal courts have contemplated this question in light of the constitutional
principles of due process and equal protection. 27 In Pugh v. Rainwater,2 8 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observes that incarcerating those individuals
that cannot meet their "master bail bond schedules" without considering
other alternatives, like finances, infringes on both due process and equal
Looking at Massachusetts precedent and
protection requirements .29
constitutional principles, the courts should naturally address whether a
defendant's financial resources should be a factor considered in making bail
determinations

.30

In Brangan v. Commonwealth, the SJC addressed whether a
Superior Court judge should consider a defendant's financial resources in
setting bail.3 1 The court looked to the applicable statute governing bail
proceedings and, relying on precedent, determined that section 57 was

23 See Querubin,795 N.E.2d at 541 n.6 ("In making a determination as to what form of release
to set, the following factors shall be considered: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, (2) the accused's family ties, (3) his financial resources, (4) his length of residence in the
community, (5) his character and mental condition, (6) his record of convictions and appearances
at court proceedings or of any previous flight to avoid prosecution or (7) any failure to appear at
any court proceedings."); see also Torres, 806 N.E.2d at 899 (quoting Querubin factors for judge
to consider when conducting bail hearings under section 57).
24 795 N.E.2d 543 (Mass. 2003).
25 See Querubin, 795 N.E.2d at 541 n.6 (referencing how Reporters' Notes "include a
discussion of the ways of guaranteeing a defendant's appearance in court.").
26 See sources cited supranote 14 (looking at language of U.S. Constitution and Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights); see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (setting limits on excessive
bail). The court described excessive bail as "a figure [set] higher than an amount reasonably
calculated to fulfill [its purpose of assuring the presence of the accused]." Id.
27 See United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating "[A] bail setting
is not constitutionally excessive merely because a defendant is financially unable to satisfy the
requirement."); White v. Wilson, 399 F2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1968) ("The mere fact that petitioner
may not have been able to pay the bail does not make it excessive.").
28 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978).
29 See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The incarceration of those
who cannot [meet master bond schedule], without meaningful consideration of other possible
alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal protection requirements.").
30 See cases cited supra notes 20, 22, 28 and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts
precedent and constitutional principles of bail in light of financial resources).
31 See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 957 (answering question at issue in context of making bail
determinations).
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controlling in this case.3 2 From there, the court ascertained section 57
indicated, amongst other historical common law factors, that financial
resources should be one of several considerations when making bail
determinations.3 Additionally, the court regarded constitutional principles
as mandating "consideration of a defendant's financial resources in setting
bail." 34
Following this discussion, the court made a powerful statement,
holding "bail that is set without any regard to whether a defendant is a pauper
or a plutocrat runs the risk of being excessive and unfair."
The SJC
32 See id. at 957-58 (determining section 58 did not apply based on precedent). The SJC
reached this conclusion because section 57 "specifically authorizes judges of the Superior Court,
among others, to admit a prisoner to bail," while section 58 does not. Id. at 957.
33 See id. at 958 (delineating factors to consider at bail hearings); see also cases cited supra
note 22 (discussing factors this court should apply to Brangan, which includes financial resources
under section 57). The court stressed that, "[a]lthough the judge must take a defendant's financial
resources into account in setting bail, that is only one of the factors to be considered, and it should
not override all the others." Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 960; see also Christopher Bavitz, MA SJC
Ruling on Bail Instructive Re: Algorithms and Criminal Justice, CYBERLAW CLINIC HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL, BERKMAN KLEIN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY (Sept. 5, 2017),
http://clinic.cyber.harvard.edu/2017/09/05/ma-sjc-ruling-on-bail-instructive-re-algorithms-andcriminal-justicel (citing same proposition in case analysis).
34 See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 958-59 (analyzing constitutional principles at play). The court
cited to the Eighth Amendment, Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and Stack
v. Boyle, amongst other sources for constitutional consideration. Id. at 958. Specifically, drawing
from Stack, the court notes that "to be reasonable, [the bail calculation] must be based on the
individual character and circumstances of each defendant, including his or her financial
circumstances." Id. (citing Stack, 342 U.S. at 5); see also Darren Griffis, Massachusetts High Court
Rules that Judges Must Consider a Defendant's FinancialResources When Setting Bail, GSKG
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.gskandg.com/massachusetts-high-court-rules-that-judges-must("[J]udges violate defendants' due
consider-a-defendant-s-financial-resources-when-setting-bal
process and equal protection rights when they set bail amounts that have the effect of confining
indigent defendants while charges are pending without regard for their financial constraints.
Defendants who cannot afford to post bail suffer a loss of liberty during a period when they are
supposed to enjoy a presumption of innocence and also lose the ability to fully participate in the
preparation of their defense.").
35 See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 959 (expanding on importance of considering defendant's
financial resources). This contention has important implications. See generally John R. Ellement,
Judges Must Set Cash Bails Defendants Can Afford, SJC Rules, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 25, 2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/08/25/sjc-judges-must-set-cash-bails-that-defendantscan-afford/LxvxqoOnCXXQLEmbNx3QAN/story.html ("Saying a pauper's freedom should be
protected with the same fervor afforded a plutocrat, the state's high court Friday instructed judges
to set bail at levels that defendants can pay in order to keep faith with legal principles laid out some
375 years ago."); Matthew Barison, Bail: What You Need to Know, BARISON LAw (Nov. 6, 2017),
http://www.matthewbarison.com/bail-need-know ("At the broadest level, the court must give each
Defendant an individualized bail determination that takes his/her financial resources into
account. This is particularly important to poor and indigent Defendants."). The Brangan court
further explained that "a $250 cash bail will have little impact on the well-to-do, for whom it is less
than the cost of a night's stay in a downtown Boston hotel, but it will probably result in detention
for a homeless person whose entire earthly belongings can be carried in a cart." Brangan,80 N.E.2d
at 959.

362

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXIII

maintained that a judge must keep in mind the question iterated by former
Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas: "Can an indigent be denied
freedom, where a wealthy man would not, because he does not happen to
have enough property to pledge for his freedom?" 36 In light of these
assertions, the SJC declared that nothing in the bail judge's order or in the
record established that he considered Brangan's financial resources in setting
bail, but moving forward, these considerations must be addressed in writing
or orally on record in every case "where bail is set in an amount that is likely
to result in a defendant's long-term pretrial detention because he or she
However, the court limited the scope of bail
cannot afford it."
there is no requirement that bail be set "in an
by
noting
determinations
amount the defendant can afford if other relevant considerations weigh more
heavily than the defendant's ability to provide the necessary security for his
appearance at trial."3 In turn, the court reversed and remanded the case for
a new bail hearing consistent with its opinion.3 9 The effects of this landmark
case will be far-reaching. 40

36

See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 959.

37 See id. (stressing necessity that record evidences financial consideration when defendant

cannot afford bail). Additionally, the Brangan court noted in a footnote that there are "practical
reasons [for] why it is sensible to avoid detaining a defendant on unaffordable bail unless it is truly
necessary." Id. at 966 n.23. These reasons include the fact that "[p]retrial detention disrupts a
defendant's employment and family relationships, with often tragic consequences" and "[p]retrial
detention disproportionately affects ethnic and racial minority groups." Id. Instead, these funds
"might be better spent on treatment and supervision" than the means currently in place. Id.
38 See id. at 954 (differentiating between requirement to consider bail affordability and
requiring bail to be affordable); see also Spring & Spring, Massachusetts Supreme JudicialCourt
Issues Reminder that Bail is Not a Substitute for a PretrialDetention Order, (Aug. 25, 2017),
https://www.massachusettscriminalattorney-blog.com/2017/08/25/massachusetts-supremejudicial-court-issues-reminder-bail-not-substitute-pretrial-detention-order/ (discussing limitation
of holding, wherein "if a trial judge properly determines a certain amount of bail is necessary to
assure a defendant's future appearance at court hearings, the bail will be upheld even if the
defendant cannot afford it.").
39 See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 967 (directing lower court, on remand, to evaluate bail in
accordance with this opinion).
40 See Daniel S. Medwed, Bail Reform and the Legacy of Justice Geraldine Hines, WGBH
(Aug.28, 2017), http://news.wgbh.org/2017/08/28/news/bail-reform-and-legacy-justice-geraldinehines ("Brangan should affect the lives of thousands of criminal defendants and save the state
millions of dollars."); see also Karen Anderson & Kevin Rothstein, State's High Court Rules on
Bails Impact on Poor Defendants, WCVB (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.wcvb.com/article/stateshigh-court-rules-on-bails-impact-on-poor-defendants/12098218 ("This decision is going to make a
big change for our clients for poor people and level the playing field and make things more equal
when it comes to the bail system in Massachusetts."); Pat Murphy, Omnibus Bills Fall Short on
Bail Reform, Defense Bar Says, MASSACHUSETrS LAWYERS WEEKLY (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://masslawyersweekly.com/2018/01/25/omnibus-bills-fall-short-on-bail-reform-defense-barsays/ (comparing how proposed House and Senate bills are taking steps to address bail
considerations in wake of Brangan). Various members of the legal community and social advocacy
groups have preferred the House's version in the efforts to reform bail, with one defense attorney,
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The SJC issued an important decision in Branganv. Commonwealth
that is meant to keep pace with legal principles laid out years ago in the
Massachusetts Body of Liberties.4 ' With this ruling, Brangan makes clear
that a defendant's financial resources should be one of several considerations
when making bail determinations.42 In turn, judges will now face more
stringent standards than before in assessing bail as they will now be required
to explain, either in writing or orally, their reasons for setting bail that go
Although Massachusetts
beyond the defendant's financial means. 43
precedent mandated consideration of a defendant's financial resources
already, Brangan requires this extra step when the bail amount will surely
exceed the defendant's ability to pay."
However, the SJC made it clear that this decision does not stand for
the proposition that bail be made affordable.45 Instead, the Brangan court
reasoned that a bail determination will be upheld even if the defendant cannot
afford to post the amount where a judge properly determines that the bail
amount is necessary to ensure a defendant's appearance at trial.4 6 Thus, the

&

David Dearborn, characterizing the House bill "as simply a good, incremental step in the right
direction."
41 See sources cited supra note 1 (laying out founding principles of bail in Massachusetts Body
of Liberties); Ellement, supra note 34 (connecting Brangan court's rationale with principles in
Massachusetts Body of Liberties); see also Bail Not Jail, supra note 2 (discussing Massachusetts
Body of Liberties in context of how a free society is "premised upon the belief that its citizens
should be afforded due process of law.").
42 See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 958 (listing various factors to consider, including financial
resources).
43 See id. at 959 ("the judge must address this [issue of financial resources] in writing or orally
on the record in every case where bail is set in an amount that is likely to result in a defendant's
long-term pretrial detention because he or she cannot afford it."); see also Ellement, supra note 34
("The SJC notified judges that they must now provide their reasoning for bail amounts that are
beyond the financial reach of defendants."); Barison, supra note 34 (discussing importance of
individualized bail determination); Griffis, supra note 33 ("Although judges were already required
to consider a defendant's financial resources in setting bail, this ruling should require judges to
more carefully weigh that particular consideration, as well as requires judges to provide a statement
of reasons when the bail amount exceeds the defendant's resources.").
4
See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 959 (stating individualized bail determinations must be
conducted when amount will go beyond defendant's financial means); cases cited supra notes 20
and 22 (highlighting Massachusetts precedent on decisions accounting for financial resources in
bail determinations).
45 See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 961 ("[A] defendant is not constitutionally entitled to an
affordable bail..."); see also Spring & Spring, supra note 37 (analyzing Brangan limitation of
affordable bail); Bail Not Jail,supra note 2 (stating SJC made it clear that this decision is not same
as making bail affordable).
46 See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 958 (discussing constitutional requirement for considering
defendant's financial resources, but acknowledging it is not sole consideration); see also Spring
Spring, supra note 37 ("If a trial judge properly determines a certain amount of bail is necessary to
assure a defendant's future appearance at court hearings, the bail will be upheld even if the
defendant cannot afford it. In those cases, trial judges are obligated to make detailed findings to
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Brangan court kept faith with constitutional principles and precedent
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Stack v. Boyle and other federal court
Nevertheless, the court's decision to implement an
decisions. 47
bail
determination is a step forward in the right direction in
individualized
making bail more affordable, particularly in light of the recent call for bail
reform.

48

Moving forward, the Massachusetts courts will now have to
implement a reasonableness test in making these individualized
determinations .49 The standards used will include the financial ability of the
defendant to post bail as a reasonable bail for one defendant (i.e. a CEO of a
company) may be excessive for another defendant (i.e. a homeless person).50
This process should lead to a reduction in pretrial detention and provide a
more level playing field for those who cannot afford bail due to their inability
to post a set bail that goes beyond their financial means."' Consecutively,
this important decision will have a major impact on both the poor and
indigent, whom have been disadvantaged by this system in the past, like
Brangan himself.52
In Brangan v. Commonwealth, the SJC confronted the issue of
whether a Superior Court judge should consider a defendant's financial

support the amount of bail being ordered."); Griffis, supra note 33 (discussing constitutional
implications on confining defendants without considering their respective financial constraints).
However, "[w]hile the court unfortunately stopped short of requiring judges to set a bail in an
amount a defendant can afford, the decision in Brangan made it clear that judges must more clearly
delineate the reasons for setting a bail that a defendant will not be able to pay." Griffis, supra note
33.
47 See sources cited supra notes 16, 25, 26, 28 (discussing constitutional precedents in Stack
and other federal courts with respect to bail).
48 See sources cited supra notes 15, 40, and accompanying text (examining bail reform efforts).
49 See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 958 (alluding to this in case analysis); see also Barison, supra
note 34 ("The test instead is based on reasonableness; the amount of bail set must be no higher than
that which would secure the [d]efendant's appearance.").
5o See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 959 (comparing how standards may differ); see also sources
cited supra note 34; Spring & Spring, supra note 37 (providing aforementioned analogy of
reasonableness between CEO and homeless individual in analysis of case).
5 See Medwed, supranote 39 ("The Brangan case should help reduce pretrial detention in the
Commonwealth. American city and county jails teem with criminal defendants languishing behind
bars before their trials, not because they pose a danger to society or represent a flight risk, but
simply because they are too poor to pay high bail sums.").
52 See Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 966 n23 ("There are also practical reasons why it is sensible to
avoid detaining a defendant on unaffordable bail unless it is truly necessary. Pretrial detention
disrupts a defendant's employment and family relationships, with often tragic consequences.
Pretrial detention disproportionately affects ethnic and racial minority groups."); see also Anderson
& Rothstein, supra note 39 ("Too many people - who are supposed to be innocent until proven
guilty - fill our jails and have their lives disrupted because they cannot afford bail. This decision
ensures that judges will take the appropriate steps to avoid detaining people simply because they're
poor.") (quoting Rahsaan Hall, director of the ACLU of Massachusetts' Racial Justice Program).
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resources in making a bail determination. Although the Brangan court
stopped short of making bail affordable, the outcome follows Massachusetts
as well as Supreme Court precedent. With this decision, the court has taken
one step forward in making bail more affordable for defendants as Brangan
will provide both poor as well as indigent defendants with an opportunity to
post bail on an individualized basis due to the new steps judges are now
required to take when setting bail.
JenniferAmaral

